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THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.
(CONCLUDED.)
III.-HOMESTEAD RIGHT-HOW PARTED WITH OR LOST.-The
homestead right may be parted with or lost:-
1. By a Voluntary Sale and Conveyance, duly executed.
2. By Judicial Sale undr a Mortgage, duly executed.
3. By total and absolute Abandonment.
We will first consider Voluntary Sales and Conveyances.-This
subject is regulated.by the statutes of the various states. These
prescribe the requisites and formalities necessary to make a valid
alienation. In order to protect the wife and family, the statutes
provide that unless she joins with her husband, any conveyance
which he may make will be ineffectual to cut off or affect the home-
stead right. In some instances any conveyance in which she does
not join is declared to be of no validity whatever; in others it is
declared that such conveyance shall not affect her right or that of
the family. To the difference in the special phraseology of the
various statutes is to be ascribed much of the apparent conflict in
the decisions on this subject.
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The homestead right of the family is peculiarly favored by the
courts. And hence it may be laid down as a general rule that, to
make an operative conveyance of the homestead, or an effectual
release or waiver of the homestead exemption, "the mode pointed
out by the statute must be strictly pursued." Poole vs. Gerrard,
6 Cal. 73; Vanzant vs. fanzant, 23 Ill. 536.
Under a statute which provides that a "conveyance of a home-
stead by the owner is of no validity, unless the husband and wife
(if the owner is married) concur in and sign such conveyance," and
that it may "be sold on execution for debts created by written
contract, executed by the persons haying the power to convey, and
expressly stipulating that the homestead is liable therefor," it was
held, that a conveyance or mortgage signed by the husband and
wife, describing the property by metes and bounds, is sufficient
without the fact being expressly stated that premises were the home-
stead. Babcock vs. Roey, 11 Iowa 375 (LowE, 0. J., dissentiente).
So under a statute which provides "that no sale or alienation
of the homestead shall be valid without the signature of the wife
to the same, acknowledged," &c., it was holden not to be necessary
to the validity of a mortgage that it should recite or state that the
premises were the homestead of the grantors. They are presumed
to know what they are granting.' Pfeiffer vs. Reihn, 13 Cal. 643.
1 In Poole vs. Gerrard, 6 Cal. 71, it was held, under the above statute, that a
homestead could only be conveyed by the joint deed of the husband and wife, and
that the separate deeds of each were both invalid. S. P. Dorzay vs. McFarland, 7
Cal. 342; 8 Id. 75. See also How vs. Adams, 28 Verm. 544.
The statute of Illinois provides that "no release or waiver of the homestead exemp-
tion shall be valid, unless the same shall be in writing, subscribed by such house-
holder and his wife, if he have one, and acknowledged in the same manner as
conveyances of real estate," &c. 'It was held, that a formal release or waiver of
the statute must be executed, and that, to make an effectual grant, the wife must
do something more than release her dower. Ki"tchell vs. Bargwin, 21 Ill. 40. 'Ex-
plained in 23 Id. 536. The usual form of acknowledgment will bind the husband;
but that of the wife must show that the officer taking it fully informed her of her
rights under the act, and that she voluntarily released or waived them. Vanzant
-vs. Vanzant, 23 Ill. 536. See further 26 IlL 107, 150.
In New Hampshire, under a statute limiting the value of the homestead to $500,
and providing that no release or waiver shall be valid unless executed by both hus-
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In those states where the conveyance of the husband without the
signature of the wife is of no validity, an executory contract or
bond of the husband to convey the homestead will not be specific-
ally enforced. It is doubtful whether such a contract would be
specifically executed, against the wife's objection, in any of the
states where homestead laws exist. Brurer vs. Wall, 23 Texas
585; Y'ost vs. Devault, 9 Iowa 60; S. C., 3 Iowa .845. But a
subsequent adoption of the premises as a homestead is no answer
to a bill for specifi c performance. Yost vs. .Devault, 3 Iowa 345.
The husband alone may defeat such a decree by showing the pre-
mises to be the homestead; he is not bound to show that the wife
refused to join in the conveyance.
Specific execution might, perhaps, be decreed, if from the acqui-
sition of another home, or from other causes, the premises have
ceased to be a homestead. 23 Texas 585.
A contract on the part of the husband to convey the homestead
is not void,1 and damages may be recovered against him for its
breach.2 23 Texas 585, supra; 9 Iowa 60, supra. But a contract
to compel his wife to convey would be an unlawful contract. Ibid.
SECOND: As to Alienation of Homestead by way of Mortgage.-
Much of what is above said in relation to sales and absolute con-
veyances is equally applicable here, and need not be repeated.
Under a statute which provides that a deed or mortgage of the
homestead "c shall not be valid without the signature of the wife,"
band and wife, it was, notwithstanding, held that a deed by the husband alone is
valid, subject to the homestead right to the value of $500, when such righ is
demanded by the husband and wife, or wife, or minor children. Atkinson vs.
Atkinson, 37 N. H. 434; Hor vs. Tufts, 39 Id. 478; Gunnison vs. Twitchell, 88 Id.
62. See also Davis vs. Andrews, 30 Verm. 678, where a similar view is taken, and
wife's-right is likened to that of dower. Bowe vs. Adams, 28 Id. 541; Sargent vs.
Wilson, 6 Cal. 504; and statutes of these states, supra. But see Richards vs. Chase,
2 Gray 383; WTilliams vs. Starr, 5 Wis. 534; Yost vs. Devault, 9 Iowa 60; Alley vs.
Bay, Id. 509; Jenny vs. Gray, 5 Ohio St. R. 45.
1 Compare with Belin vs. Burns, 17 Texas 532, where it seems to.have been con-
sidered that a note given by the vendor to the vendee, in consideration of the can-
cellation of an executory contract to sell the homestead, signed by the husband
alone, is invalid and without consideration.
2 Suggestion as to damages, 9 Iowa 60, 63; 4 Iowa 1.
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a mortgage by the husband alone is not valid even as to him. Wit-
liams vs. Starr, 5 Wis. 534; Alley vs. Bay, 9 Iowa 509. But the
benefit of the homestead law will not of course attach to premises
which become a homestead after the execution of a mortgage as
against the mortgagee. McCormick vs. Wilcox, 25 Ill. 274; Yost
vs. Devault, 3 Iowa 345; S. C., 9 Id. 60. It has been accord-
ingly adjudged, in a very recent case, that a junior mortgage of a
homestead, executed by both husband and wife, has priority over
a senior mortgage executed by the husband alone. And a pur-
chaser at a sale, under the foreclosure of such junior mortgage,
obtains a title good against the prior mortgage, although in a suit
to foreclose such prior mortgage the husband and wife are made
"parties and make no defence. Alley vs. Bay, supra. And such
purchaser may maintain a bill to set aside the prior mortgage
executed by the husband alone. This doctrine proceeds upon the
principle that any other rule , would allow the husband alone the
power to obstruct, in advance, the free exercise of the right of
alienation belonging to the husband and wife." .Dorsey vs. McFar-
land, 7 Cal. 342; same principle, 8 Id. 75.
So, also, under an act providing that ,no conveyance by a hus-
-band .... shall be valid unless the wife join," it was held, that a
mortgage by the husband alone of the homestead was utterly void,
though of far greater value than that allowed by statute. ichards
vs. hase, 2 Gray 383.
1 In other states a different view seems to be taken. Thus, in California, under
a statute which declares If that no sale or alienation of the homestead shall be valid
without the signature of the wife to the same, acknowledged, &c., and that the home-
stead shall not exceed $5000 in value," it is holden that a mortgage executed by
the husband alQue is valid as to the excess and void only as to the homestead
value. Sargent vs. Wilson, 5 Cal. 604. Of a similar opinion under their statutes
are other courts. See Atkinson vs. Atkinson, 37 N. H. 434; Horn vs. lufts, 39 Id.
478; Gunnison vs. Yitchell, 38 Id. 62; Davis vs. Andrews, 30 Verm. 678; How,
vs. Adams, 28 Id. 641.; Stewart vs. Mac'ke, 16 Texas 56, 57.
In Texas the constitution provides "that the homestead shall not be subject to
.forced sale for debts hereafter contracted." "Nor shall the owner, if a married
vman, alienate the same, unless by the consent of his wife, in such manner as the
legislature shall point out." Under these provisions it was held, 1st. That an ordi-
nary mortgage, properly executed both by husband and wife, could not be fore-
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It is a logical result of this view that a mortgage upon a home-
stead, which is void, because executed by the husband alone, is not
rendered valid by the subsequent death of the wife without children.
In such case the debt remains good, and if the homestead character
of the property is gone, and it becomes, under the statute, liable
to creditors, the mortgagee of the husband and the other creditors
stand upon the same footing, their rights not being at, all varied by
reason of the execution of such a mortgage." Revalk vs. Kraemer,
8 Cal. 66, 76. But if a prior valid mortgage exists upon the pre-.
mises at the time they become a homestead, and afterwards a new
mortgage is executed by the husband alone to a person who pays
off the first mortgage and causes it to be released, the release of
the old and the execution of the new mortgage being on the same
day, such new mortgage, being in equity treated as an assignment
of the first mortgage, is valid, though the wife did not join therein.
Swift vs. Kramer, 13 Cal. 526.
Before leaving the subject of mortgages upon the homestead, a
word may be added as to the mode of foreclosure. The wife is a
necessary party to a bill to foreclose. It is error to refuse to
closed in court or the property sold on judicial process, because such a sale would
be a "forced sale." Sed qu. 2d. That the power to alienate included the power
to mortgage, and therefore a mortgage containing a power of sale, on default of
payment, would be valid, and could legally be exercised. Sampson vs. Williamson,
6 Texas 102; 16 Id. 58. In Minnesota, under the peculiar language of the statute,
it was held by a majority of the Supreme Court, (but in our opinion with doubtful
correctness,) that the husband alone could execute a valid mortgage upon the
homestead. Olson vs. Nelson, 3 Minn. 53. But the contrary is now the law by
express statute. Laws of 1858, p. 9, 2.
The Illinois statute protects the homestead "from levy and forced sale under
judicial process." Held, that a sale made by a trustee under a deed of trust, was
not within the law, and was thereibre valid. Ely vs. "Eastwood, 26 Ill. 107; Id.
Smith vs. .Marc, 150. See, also, as to deeds of trust on homestead. Stevens vs.
Meyer, 11 Iowa 183.
1 A different, and perhaps less satisfactory conclusion, appears to have been
arrived at in another state, where it is considered that a mortgage on the home-
stead, not effectual when it is made, may yet become valid and attach as a lien by
the subsequent abandonment of the homestead and the acquisition of a new one.
Stewart vs. Jlackey, 16 Texas 56.
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allow her to intervene and claim the premises as a homestead
Sargent vs. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504. If she is not made a party her
rights are not affected. BTevalk vis. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66; Tadlock
vs. Eccles, 20 Texas 782. If the husband, being made a party,
sets up a right of homestead, the court, before decree, should
order the wife to be brought in as a party. Marks vs. Marsh, 9r
Cal. 90. If the husband alone is made a party and defends, his
rights are not concluded by the decree, and he may, notwithstand-
.ing, join with his wife in a bill to restrain the carrying of the
decree into effect. Bevalk vs. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66, 74, 75 ; Cook vs.
lnk, Id. 347. But where both the husband and wife are parties
and in court, a decree determining the property to be liable is as
binding as in other cases, and cannot be assailed except for fraud.
The question, in such cases, being by the decree res Judicata, the
homestead right cannot again be set up and litigated when an action
is brought to recover possession. But it may be, if the wife was not
a party to the decree of foreclosure. Where the parents have the
right to dispose of the homestead, without consulting the children,
whatever decree binds the parents will equally bind the children a
Lee vs. Kingsbury, 13 Texas 68; Tadlock vs. Eccles, 20 Id. 782;
Brewer vs. Wall, 23 Id. 589; Beecher vs. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488.
Exempted property is not rendered subject to levy and sale by
general creditors in consequence of being mortgaged. Collett vs.
Jones, 2 Ben. Mon. 19; Vaughan vs. Thompson, 17 Ill. 78.
THIRD: As to the Abandonment of Homestead.-We have here-
tofore seen that, in general, actual residence and occupation of*the
premises as a home by the family, are essential legal attributes of
a homestead. It results from the nature of a homestead, that a
man or the head of a family can have but one homestead at the
same time. In this -respect the homestead right is unlike the
1 Generally it may be said that in actions to determine or affect homestead
rights, the wife should be a party, See cases above, and also Wisne vs. Farnham,
2 Mich. 472. The contrary view is alone taken in Iowa. Sloan vs. Coolbaugh, 10
Iowa 81. In one state it is held, on the ground that the homestead is the joint
estate of the husband and wife, that both must join in ejectment. Poole vs. Ger-
rard, 6 Cal. 71; Taylor vs. H~argous, 4 lb. 273.
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dower right, which attaches to every parcel of which the husband
is seised during the marriage. .torn vs. Tufts, 39 N. H. 478, 483;
Howe vs. Adams, 28 Verm. (2 Williams) 544.
With respect to the abandonment of one home and the acquisi-
tion of another, the courts have frequently drawn analogies from
the rules in relation to domicil and the change of domicil. It is
not to be denied that such analogies are, in many cases, applicable.
But, on the assumption that an old homestead may be abandoned
before a new one is acquired, the rules in relation to domicil are
not entirely pertinent. For the law as to domicil is that every
man must have a domicil somewhere, and the original domicil is
not gone until a new one is actually acquired, facto et animo.
Story on Conft. Laws, § 47; Shepherd vs. Cassidy, 20 Texas 29;
T alters vs. The People, 18 Ill. 199; S. 0., 21 Ill. 178; Abbing-
ton vs. North Bridgwater, 23 Pick. 177.
The assent of the wife is not necessary to enable the husband to
select and fix the homestead. And it has also been decided that
the husband alone can change the homestead without her assent.,
Williams vs. Sweatland, 10 Iowa 51.
It is agreed that upon the acquisition of a new homestead
though of less value, the homestead right in the former is thereby
terminated. Horn vs. Tufts, 39 N. H. 478, 483; Trawick vs.
I There is no objection to investing the husband with the right to exchange one
homestead for another. But where, by statute, a sale or conveyance of the home-
stead without the signature of the wife is of no validity, it would not accord with
the nature and design of the homestead policy, to hold that the husband has the
right to require the wife to leave the homestead before a new one is acquired. If
she leaves, not assenting to the removal, her homestead rights should not be for-
feited in consequence. See, on this point, Taylor vs. Harous, 4 Cal. 268; 7 Id.
345; 10 Id. 167, 296; 16 Texas 58, where it is said, that "the wife may refuse to
abandon her homestead, or acquiesce in its sale, or other disposition, without pro-
vision for another homestead." No good objection is perceived (in the absence of
statutory regulation) to holding, on general principles, that the husband may
change the homestead, by which is meant that, when a new home has actually been
obtained, it is the right of the husband, as the head of the family, to require the
wife to remove to the new home. As there cannot be two different homesteads
at the same time, under the circumstances last supposed, it is probable that the
former homestead would lose its character as such, even though the wife might
remain in its actual possession.
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Rarris, 8 Texas 312; Taylor vs. Boulware, 17 Id. 74; 16 Id. 58;
Howe vs. Adams, 28 Verm. (2 Williams) 544; Taylor vs. Hargous,
4 Cal. 268. Not only so, but the better opinion would seem to be
that a homestead right may be waived or forfeited by clear and
decisive proof of an intention totally to relinquish and abandon it,
accompanied by removal from it, even though a new homestead
should not be gained. Any other rule would too much embarrass
the condition and rights of property, and open the way to fraud.
But it must clearly, and beyond all reasonable ground of dispute,
appear that the abandonment was with an intention not to return
and claim the exemption. A doubtful or mixed case will rot avail
to cut off the right. If there be an intention to abandon, such
intention may be changed and possession resumed before interven-
ing rights have attached. Shepherd vs. Cassidy, 20 Texas 24;
aouhenant vs. Cockrell, Id. 96; Davis vs. Andrews, 30 Verm.
678.
If the homestead right has once attached it is not indispensable
that there should be continuous actual occupation in order to pre-
serve it. The following observations of HEMPnILL, C. J., 18 Texas
417, are well supported by the decisions: ,If the citizen or family,"
says he, "c should leave in search of another home, the first would
remain until the second should be acquired. If the husband
should remove his wife and family into another county and, with-
out providing them a home, should abandon his wife, she might
again resume possession of the homestead. And no absence on
pleasure or business, and not designed as an abandonment, would
work a forfeiture of the right." S. P. Shepherd vs. Cassidy, ut
sup.; Taylor vs. Boulware, 17 Id. 74; TWalters vs. The People,
18 Ill. 194; S. C. 21 Ill. 178.
Voluntary removal, by a married woman, from the state and
domiciliation in another, deprives her of the homestead privilege.
Trawick vs. Harris, 8 Texas 312. But not the children. ralters
vs. The People, 21 Ill. 178.
So, where the husband, without being joined by his wife, sold
the homestead, and removed with his family, including his wife, to
another state, where the husband died, the widow has no right of
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homestead. Jordan vs. Godman, 19 Texas 273. So, upon the
same principle, a wife who, without good cause, voluntarily aban-
doned her husband for several years (three or four) prior to his
decease, and refused to return, forfeited thereby her claim both to
the homestead right and the widow's allowance. Earle vs. Earle,
9 Texas 630. But a removal by the family to another place within
the same state, for a temporary purpose, will not amount to an
abandonment of the homestead. Moss vs. W~arner, 10 Cal. 296.
In Taylor vs. flargous, 4 Cal. 268, on the principle that the wife
has an interest in the estate, and that the homestead right can
only be conveyed or extinguished by the joint deed of both hus-
band and wife in the manner provided by law, it was held that
removal by the husband and wife after a sale in which the wife did
not join, was neither an abandonment of the right of homestead,
nor evidence of such abandonment. See also 7 Cal. 345; -Dunn
vs. Tozer, 10 Id. 167; Dearing vs. Thomas, 25 Geo. 223.
Evidence of a desire to sell is not proof of a design to abandon
the homestead. Thus, where both husband and wife have endea-
vored to sell the homestead and, failing to do so, removed from it,
it was adjudged not to be liable to sale on execution.' -Dunn vs.
Tozer, supra. And abandonment of the homestead will not be
inferred from the fact that the head of the family is in search of
another home. Kitchell vs. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40.
IV. WHETHER A JUDGMENT IS A LIEN UPON THE HoMESTEAD.-
A question of some considerable importance has several times
1 It may be remarked that the homestead right is more liberally supported in
California than in perhaps any other state. On the principle that the homestead
exemption is intended as much for the children as for the wife, it is held that
abandonment by and adultery of the wife do not defeat the right of homestead or
divest the homestead of its character as such. Hence, a mortgage executed sub-
sequent to the wife's elopement, by the husband alone, is inoperative and void.
Lies vs. De Diablar, 12 Cal. 327; Walters vs. The People, 21 IlL 178. But in Ver-
mont a lease of the home-farm for five years, accompanied with removal of owner,
(there being no evidence of an "intention to return to the premises to live, before
the expiration of the term, if ever,") were held to forfeit the homestead right in
favor of the grantee of the husband alone. Davis vs. Andrews, 30 Verm. 678;
ifoitt vs. TFebb, 39 N. H. 158, 483. But it is otherwise where the lease is short
and there is an intention to resume possession. Hancock vs. Horgan, 17 Texas 582.
714 THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.
arisen as to the effect on the homestead property of the general
statutes, making judgments against a debtor liens upon his real
estate. The decisions relating to this subject have been made
wholly without reference to each other, and are not harmonious.
In Wisconsin a general statute provided that " all judgments in
courts of record should be liens on the real estate of every judg-
ment debtor." The homestead act declared that cthe homestead
should not be subject to forced sale on execution," &c. " The act
was silent in relation to lien of judgments; contained no provision
as to change of homestead, and rendered any alienation without
the consent of the wife, invalid. Under these circumstances, the
majority of the Supreme Court (SmITH, J., dissenting) held that
a judgment was a lien, and that whenever the homestead ceases to
be occupied as such by the debtor's voluntary act, or is aliened by
him, the lien of the judgment, which was before suspended, may
be enforced by sale on execution. Hoyt vs. Hine, 3 Wis. 752.
The same conclusion was reached in New York, in Allen vs. Cook,
26 Barb. 374. A similar view was taken in Michigan, in which
state the Supreme Court seems to have been of opinion that the
homestead character of the property would not run with or follow
the land, so as to protect it in favor of a mortgagee from a prior
judgment as to which, in. favor of the mortgagors, it would be
exempt. Chamberlain vs. ijyell, 8 Mich. (Gibbs) 448. And see
.Herschfeldt vs. George, 6 Id. 456, 469; Lawton vs. Bruce, 39
Maine 488.1
It is submitted with deference that these views are not tenable.
1 In Minnesota the statute declared a judgment to be a lien on "all the real pro-
perty of the judgment debtor in the county," &c. Another provision of the statute
exempted the homestead owned and occupied by the debtor as a-residence, from sale
on execution. The homestead statute was silent on the subject of the lien of judg-
ments, and contained no provision for a change of homestead. It was held, that a
judgment was a lien; that the homestead was exempt from sale only so long as it
was occupied by the debtor or his family; and that, upon conveyance by the husband
and wife, it ceased to remain exempt, in the hands of the grantee, from sale under
a prior judgment against the grantor. Folsom vs. Carli, 5 Minn. 833. But by the
Act of March 10, 1860, it is expressly provided that a judgment debtor may remove
from or sell the homestead without subjecting it thereby to sale bn execution.
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The homestead being exempt, and placed beyond the reach of
involuntary judicial sale, it is difficult to see, if the statute is silent
on the subject, on what principle a judgment can be said to be a
lien upon it. Such a construction of the homestead acts is justly
open to the criticism of making the "homestead of the debtor his
prison." It obstructs or defeats the free exercise of the right of
alienation belonging to both husband and wife. That a judgment
is not a lien, unless the statute expressly so declares, has been
determined in Illinois, in a very recent and well considered case.
Green vs. 31arks, 25 Ill. 221. It was accordingly held, under a
statute substantially the same as the statutes of New York and
Wisconsin, that the owner of a homestead might sell or mortgage
it, and the grantee or mortgagee took it free from the lien of a
judgment against the grantor. The principle upon which Dorsey
vs. 3ceFarland, 7 Cal. 342 ; 8 Id. 75 ; Alley vs. Bay, 9 Iowa 509;
Yost vs..De Vault, Id. 60, were decided, sustains the correctness of
the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois just cited. Indeed,
in Wisconsin, the legislature, after the decision of Hoyt vs. ine,
supra, interposed by enacting (May 17, 1858) that no judgment in
either the Federal or state court should be a lien on the homestead.
See also Act of Iowa Legislature, Session 1861-62. The question
as to whether a judgment is a lien, the statute being silent, is
before the Supreme Court of Iowa, and not yet decided. The
decision will doubtless appear in 13th Iowa Reports.
HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATE TO VENDOR'S LIEN.-MNany
of the statutes contain an express provision that the homestead
exemption shall not exist as against the claim of the vendor for
the purchase-money. But even where there is no such statute the
lien or claim of the vendor for the unpaid purchase-money would
be preferred to the debtor's right of homestead. Farmer vs. Simp-
son, 6 Texas 303; Barnes vs. Gay, 7 Iowa 26; Dillon vs. Byrne,
5 Cal. 455; Shepherd vs. White, 11 Texas 354; Montgomery vs.
Tutt, 11 Cal. 190; Phelps vs. Oonover, 25 Ill. 309; Stone vs. Dar-
nell, 20 Texas 14; Succession of Foulkes, 12 La. An. 537; 13
Cal. 75.
And the vendor's right will be thus preferred even if the old
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mortgage given for the purchase-money be cancelled, and a new
mortgage on the same and other property, executed by the husband
alone, be taken to secure the same and another debt. - -Dillon vs.
Byrne, supra; Barnes vs. Gay, supra; Swift vs. -Kraemer, 13
Cal. 526.
So, also, on the same principle, where the husband who was
residing on the place as a tenant purchased the same, and to
enable him to do so borrowed the whole purchase-money from
another person, and without his wife joining executed a mortgage
to secure the money thus borrowed simultaneously with his receiv-
ing a deed, the homestead right, notwithstanding the non-joinder
of the wife, is subordinate to the mortgage. Lassen vs. Vance,
8 Cal. 271.
On a similar principle, where there is a resulting trust, and the
trustee holds the legal title in trust for the real owner, the trustee
cannot acquire upon the land a homestead discharged of the trust.
Shepherd vs. White, 11 Texas 346. So a mechanic's lien, if the
party is by law entitled to a lien, has priority over the homestead
right of the owner. Merchant vs. Perez, 11 Texas 20. But the
husband alone cannot as against the homestead right enlarge the
demands of the vendor or mechanic by agreeing to pay him more
interest than was due by the original contract. MeHenry vs.
Ieilly, 13 Cal. 75; 5 Id. 455. And there may be a waiver by the
vendor of his right which will leave the homestead right paramount.
Phelps vs. Conover, 25 Ill. 309. But the taking of a new mort-
gage for the purchase-money does not amount to such waiver.
Dillon vs. Byrne, 5 Cal. 455; Barnes vs. Gay, 7 Iowa 26.
A citation in a note of some cases referring to subjects not
properly within the scope of the foregoing article, may prove
acceptable to the reader.'
Davenport, Iowa. J.F.D.
I Homestead acts are without effect as to prior creditors. Hilne vs. Smith, 12 La.
An. R. 553; 10 Id. 509; Succesion of Aaron, 11 Id. 671; Simonds vs. Powers, 28
Verm. (2 Williams) .54; Grayson vs. Taylor, 14 Texas 672; Lawton vs. Bruce, 39
Maine 484. Qucere, whether the legislature has the power to exempt the homestead
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from liability for antecedent debts? Charlesqs vs. Lamberson, 1 Iowa 442. It has
not. I Denio 129; 3 Id. 594; 1 Comst. 129. See 3 Iowa 287.
When exempt, sale and deed by sheriff are void, and a bill lies to cancel. Pink
erton vs. Tumlin, 22 Geo. 165; Beecher vs. .Baldy, 7 Mich. 488. When the sale is
void the sheriff is not liable to homestead owner for damages. Kendall vs. Clark,
10 Cal. 17.
Mortgagee of homestead may release the same without affecting his right to par-
ticipate in the proceeds of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors pro
rata. Dickson vs. Chorn, 6 Iowa 19. The rule that where a creditor has two funds,
he may be required to resort to that fund upon which another has no lien, does not
apply to such a case. Id.
Marshalling of assets and securities as connected with homestead right. Beals
vs. Clark, 13 Gray 18; 6 Iowa 19; Wood vs. Wheeler, 7 Texas 13; S. C. 11 Id. 122;
James vs. Thompson, 14 Id. 463; 20 Id. 247.
Sale where value is limited, and appropriation of excess. Dearing vs. Thomas,
25 Geo. 223 ; Gary vs. Eastabrook, 6 Cal. 457 ; Wood vs. Wheeler, 7 Texas 13 ;
S. C. 11 Id. 122; 15 Texas 174; Fletcher vs. State Bank, 37 N. H. 369. Value as
of what date to be ascertained. fterschfeldt vs. George, 6 Mich. 456. Bill in equity
will lie to determine value, if there is no statutory mode. 7 Mich. 488.
Proceeds, it seems, are not subject to garnishment for the husband's debts, if
made payable to the wife, to induce her to sign a deed for the homestead. Ogden
vs. Giddings, 15 Texas 485. See, as to garnishment of proceeds of exempt pro-
perty, 27 Verm. (1 Williams) 561; 29 Id. 291, Opinion by REDFIELD, C. J.
Notice of homestead rights. Recorded notice not necessary, unless statute so
requires-actual occupation sufficient notice. 4 Cal. 23, 26; 6 Id. 165; 7 Mich.
503, 505. Even when notice to officer is required, it may be verbal, and is suffi-
cient if given after levy and before sale. 7 Mich. 488, 510; 29 Penn. St. R. 362;
3 Iowa 292.
Grantee, and those claiming under him, are bound to take notice of a recital in
his grantor's deed in relation to the residence of the grantor upon the premises. 10
Iowa 51.
Head of family, who? Wood vs. Wheeler, 17 Texas 13, 20; 11 Iowa 104; Id.
227; 20 Mo. 75; 22 Id. 464; 3 Humph. 216; 17 Ala. 486; 4 Id. 554; 7 Id. 721;
31 Id. 192; 14 Barb. 456; 18 Johns. 400; 8 Cal. 66; 17 Texas 74.
Repeal of Exemption Act. "It is competent for the legislature to take away
exemptions, or to require a record of the exemption when hone was required
before." DEwEy, J., 13 Gray 24. See also 11 Richards (Law) 353. But see 4 G.
Greene (Iowa) 563, where a questionable reason is given for what, under the
general statute of the state saving rights acquired under repealed statutes, is a
sound decision. Helfenstein vs. Gore, 3 Iowa 287; 23 Texas 498; 14 Id. 672..
Effect of extension of city limits so as to embrace a country homestead. Taylor
vs. Boulware, 17 Texas 74; Finley vs. Dietrich et al., 12 Iowa 516.
